Sovereignty is a tricky word. On the one hand it stands for all that is patriotic and embodies pride. On the other hand the very patriotism and pride that it invokes guide the respective believers to sink into unrealistic and often delusionary assumptions.
Eventually, as and when this feeling of sovereignty gets hurt by an agent (read China), when this pride is curtailed by harsh realities (read untenable military ambitions), it is an awakening that in terms of geopolitics would take you to the White House.
Ask Philippines!
China is possibly regretting the way it dealt with its immediate neighbors including Philippines in the South China Sea and the resultant citing of American hull—USS Fitzgerald—in its traditional zone of influence.
On the 16th of November on board the USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Philippine Secretary for Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario signed the Manila Declaration.
A part of declaration
read:
“We (US and Philippines) share a common interest in maintaining freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and transit of people across the seas and subscribe to a rules-based approach in resolving competing claims in maritime areas through peaceful, collaborative, multilateral, and diplomatic processes within the framework of international law.”—emphasis added.
On board the ship, Ms. Clinton
said in a speech: “The USS Fitzgerald has patrolled the entire Western Pacific region this year. It traveled to Australia, Russia, Guam, Saipan, the Marshall Islands, before docking here in Manila Bay. As part of Operation Tomodachi, the search, rescue, and recovery mission following the earthquake, the tsunami, and the nuclear reactor meltdown in Japan, the Fitzgerald operated closest to shore. And this summer, it transited the Gregorio del Pilar the flagship of the Filipino Navy on its maiden voyage across the Pacific. The ships cross-decked and held training sessions for 16 days on emergency response and onboard medical procedures. By the end of the exercise, the officers and crews onboard both vessels achieved new levels of proficiency and partnership.”
Chipping away the niceties in the speech and analyzing the substance would produce 4 points:
1. US Navy has unrestricted and unquestioned access to what it calls the high seas or the international waters.
2. US Navy enjoys a pre-eminence in rescue operations (which often leads to concrete relationship in post-crises periods).
3. US Navy enjoys cordial relationship with its previous rival (Russia; please see that ‘Russia’ is pronounced next to ‘Australia’).
4. US Navy cares for its allies and is keen on enhancing interoperability with Philippines.
But there is one critical point that we should not miss in the declaration. “…subscribe to a rules-based approach in resolving competing claims in maritime areas through peaceful, collaborative, multilateral, and diplomatic processes.”
All these years, the US has maintained a neutral stand in South China Sea dispute refusing to side with the claimants. Now it has changed the tack, and is taking active interest in the whole issue. One can argue that by using the world ‘multilateral’, the US is calling for enhanced ASEAN participation in the till-date regional issue.
But the very fact that the words virtually came from the mouth of none other than the US Secretary of State puts across a point: The US will have the role of a patron, if not a mediator. Any inkling of doubt in this regard is obliterated when you look at the venue where the declaration was signed: the battle ship of the most powerful Navy in the world! Unusual and probably unprecedented, in effect, it was as good as signing the declaration on American soil.
What could this be if not a strong message to China?
Origins: South China Sea (SCS) dispute
A few would recall that the SCS island disputes originated with the end of the Second World War.
In the San Francisco conference of 1951, the Allied powers failed to identify who had the title to the South China Sea islands—Spartlys and Paracel-- when they stripped Japan off the possession of the same after the Pacific War in Article 2(f) of the San Francisco Treaty. (Japan occupied the islands in 1939, when the war was on foot.)
This paved way for the littoral states like Philippines and Vietnam to raise the claims.
Had China not fallen to the Communists, the treaty may well have accorded island titles to the Chinese. But as fate would have it, this did not happen. In fact in one way or other, the Chinese had laid claim to the disputed islands during various instances in 1877 (Qing dynasty), 1883 and 1887.
In fact, even before the conference, on August 15, 1951, the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai affirmed China’s claim on the islands (
see the current map). But these claims went unheeded and Allied powers were in no mood to bequeath the islands to Communist China.
Now, only problem is that historical precedents alone will not help China calcify its claims. “Continuous and effective acts of occupation”; which worked in disputes concerning Island of Palmas, Clipperton and Eastern Greenland at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, would do.
This partly explains the developments manifested as claims, occupations and counter occupations in the South China Sea Islands in the past years by various parties, including
China, Vietnam and Philippines.
Source: eia.doe.gov, 2008; UNCLOS=United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
What brings the US to the table?
But, the Island disputes though central to the problem of the South China Sea, singularly cannot warrant US intervention in the issue.
It needs to be something more important, lethal to be precise:
In an
opinion piece written in the month of August in The Heritage Foundation portal, Renato De Castro and Walter Lohman said:
“On March 2, 2011, in the South China Sea, two Chinese patrol boats confronted a survey ship commissioned by the Philippine Department of Energy to conduct oil exploration in the Reed Bank, just 80 nautical miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan. The survey ship was in the process of identifying sites for possible appraisal wells to be drilled for the next phase of a contract with the Philippine Department of Energy, when it was accosted.
According to Philippine sources, the Chinese boats moved dangerously close to the Philippine vessel twice, as they ordered it to leave the area. Then, the Chinese boats maneuvered straight toward the survey vessel two times, apparently threatening to ram it, but turned away in time. The unarmed survey vessel radioed for assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Western Command in Palawan, and the Philippine Air Force (PAF) dispatched two reconnaissance planes to fly over the area. The Chinese patrol boats, however, had left the area before the aircraft arrived.”
After due diplomatic consultations between both sides, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III said that he wanted to defuse the tension between the two countries and announced that an unarmed Philippine Coast Guard patrol craft would be deployed to protect the survey ship conducting oil exploration at the Reed Bank.
In other words, it was all he could do; despite his country’s sovereignty getting violated in the Exclusive Economic Zone that stretched 200 kilometers into the ocean in blatant terms, that was all he could do.
Meanwhile, Chinese embassy officials in Manila insisted that China had indisputable sovereignty over the “Nansha Islands” (Spratlys) and their adjacent maritime territory. China was blind to the fact that the claims are disputed and the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) stipulates 200nm EEZ rights to the Philippines.
China has ratified the convention but with
riders attached that gives it exclusive sovereignty on the disputed islands which means exclusive EEZ rights (though that may overlap with EEZ claims made by others under the provisions of the same convention!) and has reaffirmed that, “the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through the territorial sea shall not prejudice the right of a coastal State to request, in accordance with its laws and regulations, a foreign State to obtain advance approval from or give prior notification to the coastal State for the passage of its warships through the territorial sea of the coastal State.”
In other words, the Freedom of the Seas as enjoyed by traditional maritime powers like US would require Chinese approval or at least notifying China, if the US Navy or some other forces ever has to pass through the SCS.
Clearly US is vehemently against this.
Writes Walter Lohman in another
opinion piece in The Heritage Foundation portal:
“(Freedom of the Seas) is a bedrock, non-negotiable interest of the United States. The U.S. is the world’s preeminent seafaring nation. When it comes to the South China Sea—through which half of global shipping and most of Northeast Asia’s energy supplies transit—its position is consistent: All nations enjoy navigational rights and freedoms there that are qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those applicable on the high seas.”
The caveat is here: SCS is a vital shipping lane and by far the shortest route from the North Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. The world’s second busiest international sea-lane, with over half of the world’s petroleum-bearing traffic passing through, the region boasts of rich fishery resources, and is widely said to hold enormous potential as a source of oil and natural gas.
Clearly, it is a region that the US cannot ignore as long as it cares about its multi-faceted national interests. If the US, by far thousands of kilometers away from the region, is finding the region to be important, one can only sigh at the enormous interest China has in the Sea; China’s vulnerable backyard.
It also tells us why China is reluctant to involve third parties in the issue; especially the US.
The United States was among the nations that participated in the third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place from 1973 through 1982
and resulted in the international treaty known as the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States also participated in the subsequent
negotiations of modifications to the treaty from 1990 to 1994. The UNCLOS came into
force in 1994. Although the United States now recognizes the UNCLOS as a
codification of customary international law, it has not ratified it.From nationalsovereignty to taxation to economics,
a variety of arguments is doing rounds for the non-ratification of treaty by the United States.
Writes David A. Ridenour in an
article: “…there are serious flaws in the treaty that -if U.S. ratified the treaty - could place U.S. sovereignty, security and political
independence in doubt.” “The "right of innocent passage" is the right of any
nation's ships to traverse continuously and expeditiously through the territorial
waters of a coastal nation, subject to certain conditions. Under the Law of the Sea
Treaty, such passage is conditioned on passing in a manner that isn't threatening to
"sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence" or the "good order and
security" of that nation.
By this definition, if the Law of the Sea Treaty was a ship, it would fail to qualify.”—he elaborates. So clearly there are tussles: While states like Philippines and China interpret the UNCLOS in their own terms that foments episodes of uncalled-for provocations, pre-eminent sea faring powers like the US are reluctant to cede the
‘traditional rights’ that they have enjoyed for decades. Both these tussles are shaping the nature of future conflicts in the South China Sea.
In a 1998 Pacific Forum CSIS paper titled, ‘Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict’, prepared by Ralph A. Cossa it is said, “the proximity of the Spratlys to South China Sea shipping lanes adds an important strategic element to the dispute. A threat to freedom of passage through the South China Seas would severely disrupt regional economies. If, during any military action in the Spratlys--or, for that matter, in the course of defining its claim over the currently occupied or coveted territory--any nation threatened to inhibit the free flow of maritime traffic along these critical SLOCs (Sea lines of communication), the U.S. would almost certainly become involved since America's economic growth and security depend upon continued freedom of navigation for both merchant and military shipping. Other nations heavily dependent on maritime commerce could be expected to at least endorse, if not actively participate in, any U.S.-led enforcement of freedom of navigation along the South China Sea's heavily-traveled sea lanes.”
Profound and prophetic!
Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal has
reported that “Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao reluctantly discussed the issue with 17 other leaders at the East Asia Summit in Bali, Indonesia, on Saturday (November 20, 2011) while restating China's position that it was an inappropriate forum to address the matter, according to U.S. and Chinese official accounts of the meeting.”
The reported noted that Five Asean members—Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand—as well as Australia and India raised the South China Sea issue directly at the Chinese Premier.
(Meanwhile, a U.S. official denied that he had lobbied other attendees to put the South China Sea on the agenda.)
China's state-run Xinhua news agency quoted Mr. Wen saying: "I don't want to discuss this issue at the summit. However, leaders of some countries mentioned China on the issue. It's impolite not to make a return for what one receives. So, I am willing to reiterate China's stance.” The Wall Street Journal said.
Axial shift in the stand of small littoral states
To involve US in the issue is an axial shift in the stand of all the littoral states that has cemented their grouping under the ASEAN umbrella.
This is because the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea proved to be an ineffectual angel. As per the crux of the
declaration signed by ASEAN and China in 2002:
• The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
• The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.
This has sporadically been violated by China many times. No wonder ASEAN sent the SOS to US.
Password: Philippines
“This incident (Reed Bank incident)—and at least eight others since February 25—underscores the sensitivity of the territorial dispute in the bilateral Philippines–China relationship; highlights broader tensions in the South China Sea, which is claimed in whole or part by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan; and starkly points to the continued relevance of the obligations embodied in the 1951 U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.” Renato De Castro and Walter Lohman
added.
It has to be noted that,
U.S.-Philippine relations are based on shared history and commitment to democratic principles, as well as on economic ties.
The historical and cultural links between the Philippines and the United States remain strong. The Philippines modeled its governmental institutions on those of the United States and continues to share a commitment to democracy and human rights. At the most fundamental level of bilateral relations, human links continue to form a strong bridge between the two countries. (There are an estimated four million Americans of Philippine ancestry in the United States, and more than 300,000 American citizens in the Philippines.)
Until November 1992, pursuant to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, the United States maintained and operated major facilities at Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Complex, and several small subsidiary installations in the Philippines. In August 1991, negotiators from the two countries reached agreement on a draft treaty providing for use of Subic Bay Naval Base by U.S. forces for 10 years…
The post-U.S. bases era has seen U.S.-Philippine relations improved and broadened, with a prominent focus on economic and commercial ties while maintaining the importance of the security dimension. U.S. investment continues to play an important role in the Philippine economy, while a strong security relationship rests on the 1952 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). In February 1998, U.S. and Philippine negotiators concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), paving the way for increased military cooperation under the MDT. The agreement was approved by the Philippine Senate in May 1999 and entered into force on June 1, 1999. Under the VFA, the United States has conducted ship visits to Philippine ports and resumed large combined military exercises with Philippine forces.
In October 2003, the United States designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally. That same month, the Philippines joined the select group of countries to have ratified all 12 UN counterterrorism conventions.
The
military relation between both states has been gaining traction and China may backtrack if not launch another round of charm offensive for a while to pacify the situation in SCS. Estranging its neighbors may not prove good for China and Beijing knows this well. In the same breath, estranging China is not good for other littoral states.
“While the core problem is a regional one, global issues and concerns are raised that could have far-reaching consequences. Today, all parties have a vested interest in a peaceful resolution of the dispute. As a result, the prospects for conflict seem low in the near term. However, the potential for conflict remains and could grow, especially if potential triggers of conflict are not clearly understood and avoided.” the paper ‘Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict’, prepared by Ralph A. Cossa cautioned.
“While the prospects of military confrontation over the Spratlys remains low, it would be naive to completely rule out the possibility of the use of force. This is especially so if major oil discoveries are made or if energy shortages add to the perceived (even if unproven) importance of the Spratlys.” It said, and added. “If it were positively determined tomorrow that there was no exploitable oil in the Spratlys, the dispute would not go away; no claimant would, as a result of such news, abandon its claim—the bottom line issue is still sovereignty.”
With the US declaring the
Pacific Century in a big way, it is not going to be deluded by the charm offensive that China may launch. With Canberra in tight embrace and Manila joining the stable, the US will continue to make its presence felt in the traditional Chinese zone of influence.
The question is whether other ASEAN members would start talking Filipino? Well, that depends a lot on China.
As I said in the beginning, sovereignty is a tricky word!
As published in the think-tank portal Center for Asia Studies, Chennai
