Addressing and resolving the Mullaperiyar issue

Whichever way you look at it, the issue of Mullaperiyar dam is all about resistance!
The dam itself is resisting the colossal pressure exerted by a water-body of incredible and breath-taking space for the past 116 years!

The politicians on either side—Kerala and Tamil Nadu-- are fighting over the issue sparing no resources at command and offering stiff resistance to each other.

The media on either side of the State border is reportedly in war and receiving skeptical comments that either say they are spreading panic—in case media organisations belong to Kerala—or they are misinforming people; in case they belong to Tamil Nadu. Again a scenario of mutual resistance!

The lay men—mostly farmers-- inhabiting the valley that fall between the disaster-prone Mullaperriyar dam and the Idukki dam (on the Kerala side) scowl at the irrigation issues faced by their counterparts in Theni, Dindigul, Madurai, Sivaganga and Ramanathapuram in Tamil Nadu, even as the latter group alleges the Keralites harbouring vested interests. Resistance and counter-resistance!

The face-offs mentioned above are in addition to ‘chronic resistance’ on either side posed by activists, celebrities, legal entities, NGOs and various institutions!
And all these ‘resistances’ can be traced back to a dynasty of Kings in Travancore who offered genuine, well informed and sound resistance-- mother of all resistance--for two decades to signing of the ‘Periyar Lease Deed 1886’.

The deed ultimately allowed all the waters of Mullaperiyar to Madras Presidency for a period of 999 years with a provision for the lessee (Madras Presidency) to extend the lease deed another 999 years if it desired to do so (the latter provision was later scrapped).

In effect a literal and almost permanent ceding of river-water rights by Kerala for 1998 years; well into the fag end of next millennia. Euphemistically, quite unheard of! The deed also leased out 8000 acres of forest land to Madras Presidency.

Despite the royal resistance, at the end of the day, British had their way and The Maharaja of Travancore signed the agreement saying, “I am signing this agreement with my blood”.

The British Government held that the waters of the Periyar were “useless and likely to remain useless” to Travancore and that the land being an uninhabited jungle, was of little value. The Travancore Government contended that the lease value should be appraised in terms of the high utility of the land to the British Government, says a study (Madhusoodhanan C.G. and Sreeja K.G. 2010.The Mullaperiyar Conflict. NIAS Backgrounder on Conflict Resolution, B4-2010, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore).

And following this steadfast British stand and the subsequent agreement:

…the upper reaches of the west flowing Periyar River within the territory of Travancore state was diverted eastward for the purpose of irrigating the arid lands in the Vaigai Basin of British province of Madras. The project consisting of a masonry dam in lime and surki mortar, considered the first of its kind to be accomplished by the British Royal Engineering Corps, was completed in 1895, the study notes.

On the other side of the border in today’s Tamil Nadu, recurring famines were a problem, and the British, perhaps facing the prospects of social unrest, wanted a solution for the same which they found in the dam.

However, the current mumbo-jumbo that abounds with regard to the issue, and the media hype surrounding the imbroglio have been so thick that after listening to and reading all you can, you end up with a question:

What actually is the problem?

This is it: A dam is standing tall, leaking and leaching surki mortar well after its expiry date by 50-60 years.

In the mean time this antique piece of wonder has seen innumerable legal spats, umpteen tremors, five expert committee studies, processions, protests and what-not!

And still, the issue remains unresolved, the court battles prolong and people get more scared.

Why has the issue not been resolved?

A strange backdrop and facilitating vacuum

Before going deep, it is helpful to understand that there is a pertinent backdrop to all that is happening as well as a facilitating vacuum .

As mentioned in the beginning, Tamil Nadu leased the land in Kerala’s territory.

The location of Mullaperiyar dam owned by one state in leased in lands within the territory of another state has itself been a point of friction between the two governments from time to time. There have been reported clashes even prior to 1979 between the Forest Department of Kerala and PWD of Tamil Nadu regarding various aspects such as quarrying, cultivation, denudation of forests etc. in these leased lands… Seemingly minor and unrelated to the main conflict, the issues of the operation and maintenance of a structure within another state’s administrative boundary (Kerala) has had huge implications in setting the backdrop of the conflict.—the study notes.

At some other point the study points out a systemic fault and a facilitating vacuum. On the Supreme Court directives, it is the government at the centre who is acting as a mediator on the Mullaperiyar issue. And as the study explains:

The technical issues related to safety of the dam were raised before the technical authority at the Centre which acted by restricting the water level and suggesting the strengthening measures. A power play between Kerala and the Centre over the authority to decide on the safety of the dam began when the CWC (Central Water Commission)-led expert committee with representatives from both the states failed to reach an amicable and unanimous solution on the issue of dam safety. Dissatisfied with the decision of the expert committee of the Ministry of Water Resources, Kerala entrusted national level institutes to conduct independent assessments and moreover enacted an act to restrict the water level at Mullaperiyar to ensure its safety. These actions have furthered the trouble brewing between Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

The legal fracas and all the hullaballoo could have been “avoided if there was a unanimous and dependable technical assessment regarding the safety of the dam.”

The three fault lines

Subsequent to India’s independence the ‘Periyar Lease Deed 1886’ would have been nullified. But the signatories (Kerala and Tamil Nadu) propelled by some crude and unusual logic agreed to maintain the status quo with regard to the deed.

The deed in pre-independence era had not envisaged exploiting the dam for power generation. But in 1932, when generating hydro-electric power became economically viable, Madras Presidency came up with a proposal in this regard pertaining to Mullaperiyar.

This was vehemently opposed by the State of Travancore who cited the deed and pointed out that it only allowed for utilizing the dam for purposes of irrigation. When arbitrations failed, an Umpire had to be deployed by the British who ruled in 1942 that water should be used only for irrigation purposes by the Madras Presidency.

Despite this, post-independence, the successor to Madras Presidency, Tamil Nadu unilaterally and without consent from successor to Travancore State, Kerala, went ahead with power generation at Mullaperiyar dam in a phased manner; the project was consummated in 1965 with four units of 35 MW totaling 140 MW installed capacity.

The then government of Kerala did not even whimper.

This was the first instance of political shortfall from Kerala’s side. It gave the leaders in Tamil Nadu false confidence that Kerala could be taken for granted and that Tamil Nadu had absolute authority over the dam. The authorities there never had the notion that they were carrying out something illegitimate. In other words, it was a display of arrogance against lethargy with the latter giving rise to former.

That was the period when five year plans had started to change the Indian economic landscape. India wanted more of food, more of energy, more of literally everything! This translated into more of dams, more of power projects and better livelihoods.

But the way in which Tamil Nadu secured the said necessities when it came to Mullaperiyar was deplorable.

And it is thoroughly puzzling that the then Kerala government allowed such massive hydroelectric power project within its zone of authority to come-up without its consent.

These factors—lethargic mindset of Kerala and the arrogant attitude of Tamil Nadu --constitute the first fault line. It has to be noted that the subsequent activities—or the lack of them, when one speaks about Kerala-- down the road by both States have always been consistent with the respective attitudes displayed: Kerala has been lethargic throughout and Tamil Nadu arrogant.

But, the late hare that was Kerala finally managed to catch up with the smart tortoise and guess what; lost race altogether and regrettably forever!

“In 1970, the 1886 agreement was amended and a new agreement ratifying the Periyar hydroelectric project with effect from 1954 was entered into by the two states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

The amendments allowed the continuance with the lease period of 999 years though it deleted the provision of extension of the deed to yet another 999 years.”—the study says.

While the retrospective provision in the agreement concerning the hydroelectric power project legitimized an illegal construction, the continuance of the deed period to 999 years turned a blind eye to the interests and requirements of many a generation of Keralites.

This had two impacts: legitimizing of an illegal activity gave confidence to Tamil Nadu that it can carry out virtually any activities in the dam and its premises without facing any consequences, legal or whatsoever which lent it additional firepower in arrogance.

This absolute authority when challenged—for instance, in the form of a genuine concern put forth by Kerala regarding the dam safety--evokes only egoistic jingoism in Tamil Nadu manifested as economic blockades targeting Kerala and political rhetoric as well as heightened emotional splurge.

Another impact was that ceding the water rights for 999 years by Kerala almost permanently tattooed the wrong impression in the Tamil Nadu psyche that, after all Kerala does not really need water. Also, it has been widely held Kerala is a land blessed by rain gods. These two notions formed the second fault line.

But the biggest and the most dangerous fault line—third one—was that the public on either sides were kept in dark:

While both the states treated the Periyar Project and lease deed as fait accompli subsequent to its expiry on Indian independence, the decisions--the informal agreement to continue with the staus quo until 1970 and then the amendment--were carried out without any public discussion. Factual information was not shared with public adequately or with responsibility. And the issue, after cropping up suddenly into the public domain, became rife with political subterfuges and propaganda.

Even in this age of information, this particular fault line is witnessing a mammoth build up in pressure as evidenced by chauvinistic social media publicity on both sides and prime time media wars.

And the lack of informed public discussion and absence of mutual confidence paved way for third party involvement for the resolution of the conflict, which ultimately added to the intricacy of the issue.

In fact, the crux of the present conflict over dam safety rests on the decision taken by the Central Water Commission led Expert Committee that the dam is safe to hold waters up to a level measuring 142 ft against a capacity of 152 feet. Even the Supreme Court order of 2006 is based on this assessment.

The Court order allowed Tamil Nadu to raise the water level of Mullaperiyar dam from 136 ft to 142 ft and implement certain recommended safety measures.

A fault-line-in-making

Currently in Tamil Nadu, people feel that the ‘fear psychosis of leaks’ is a work of vested interests to divert the waters of Mullaperiyar into the Idukki reservoir in Kerala for power generation and irrigation!

“…acceptance of a new dam is perceived as a means to make them (Tamil Nadu) accept a new agreement which would threaten the established use of water there for over a century.” the study points out.

No wonder, Tamil Nadu, if at all it agrees for a new dam would certainly demand the same outrageous deed governing it!

But the study adds:

What remains unarticulated in the discussions on a new dam is whether the old deed steeped in controversy would remain in force for the new one also. When this question was raised by the Supreme Court during the hearing in 2009 both the states remained silent on the issue. Kerala aims for a new contractual agreement which would ensure it too benefits from the interstate river water diversion, whereas Tamil Nadu for whom the present arrangement under the 1886 deed is the best possible scenario, fears a new deed that would inevitably follow a new dam.

If this is not a fault line, it is definitely a fault-line in making.

Why Kerala demands a new dam?

While the pressure build-up in the three fault lines added fire and fury to the arguments and counter-arguments on the surface and helped in aggravating the crisis, the dam is still standing tall. The study informs:

“Kerala argues that it is imperative to replace the old dam since it will not in any case survive the deed period of 999 years. The breach of the dam, according to Kerala, would wash away a stretch of about 25 km between Mullaperiyar and Idukki dam affecting a population of around one lakh people.

Kerala also fears that the Idukki dam may not be able to withstand the onslaught of the Mullaperiyar waters in which case a major disaster would ensue that would destroy the downstream dense settlements affecting millions of inhabitants.” (This has been contradicted by the Advocate General of Kerala in the High Court of Kerala and is a subject of controversy. The Kerala Government has distanced itself away from the argument placed by the Advocate General. However, the submission of Advocate General does not lend any credence to Tamil Nadu’s argument that the Mullapperiyar dam is a safe structure in itself).

“Kerala challenges Tamil Nadu’s claim on the grounds that that no repair work has been carried out in the main dam below 112 ft due to standing water column. It also argues that even if it were to accept Tamil Nadu’s claim that the dam at Idukki would be able to contain the waters in the case of a tragedy at Mullaperiyar, there is still the stretch that lies between the two dams.

Kerala has gone to the extent of pointing out that there is vast number of Tamil speaking population in this stretch. Kerala feels that it is not right to overtax a century old structure at the cost of the life of the people of the donor state. It goes on to point out that a dam failure and its ramifications would make it impossible for Tamil Nadu to enjoy the benefits of the present deed.” the study adds.

Dam decommissioning and easing fault line pressures

While nobody in Kerala would support the Mullaperiyar dam in its current form, it may be argued that practical difficulties exist on the part of the Kerala government to unilaterally adopt measures to decommission the dam. Unfortunately this argument holds no water.

A dam well past its expiry date is standing there like a ticking time bomb and holding to ransom the lives and livelihoods of at least one lakh people; not to speak of the immediate ecology that surrounds it. The strong and permeating feeling in Kerala is that government should do whatever it takes and decommission the dam, even if it calls for a unilateral measure.

If the government fails in its cardinal duty of protecting its people from a collateral damage, it can ultimately result in utter inter-state chaos and political destabilization in the south for a long period of time.

Needless to say, this is not the occasion for the government to while away time writing letters, holding cabinet meetings, consulting Prime Minister and to indulge in building consensus across state borders.

Agreed that all these activities are valuable in a democracy and should be adhered to. But democracy should not soak itself with blood and tears. That part is over for India since the midnight of August 15, 1947.

The Kerala government’s historical lethargy in the matter should be done away with at the earliest and the government and other political parties in the State must do all they can and decommission the dam and bring things back to normalcy at the earliest. In this regard, whatever resistance that Tamil Nadu may place should be addressed appropriately.

It is worth reminding that the indignant indifference and the attitude we-will-have-our-way-come-what-may that Tamil Nadu has deployed can be traced back to the arrogance that it produced in the wake of the Kerala government’s erstwhile lethargy. This fault line issue should be tackled and the Kerala government should not shy away from that responsibility. Any other pursuits of regular politics should be temporarily laid to rest and the dam should be decommissioned.

But then, how could the poor farmers who sustain on the water from dam in the districts of Sivaganga, Ramanathapuram, Theni etc would survive, one may ask.

The concern is a genuine one.

But it is prima facie clear that the dam or the lack of it, does not pose any immediate and collateral damage to the farmers in Tamil Nadu, but out here in Kerala, people face that deadly prospect. This reality renders various solutions to Tamil Nadu which they should start working out at the earliest. In this regard, both states can coordinate.

And, once the dam is decommissioned, the deed should be re-negotiated. Whether or not a new dam is needed should be discussed widely.

For this, the second fault line should also be eased off pressure. It has to be put across in the clearest terms that, as a State, Kerala too needs water; that there exists a multitude of people in Kerala who lack water to meet their daily needs.

But as long as the third fault line exists, absence of current and authentic information, easing pressure in the second fault line cannot be worked out.

It would do well if authorities on both sides make public all the facts related to the issue in a properly classified free database and help bring some clarity. Then, the media, activists and the public at large can access this information and arrive at right decisions.

On a higher level, the facilitating vacuum—the absence of a dependable mechanism for technical assessment regarding the safety of the dam-- should be addressed by the government at the Centre.

If certain reports are to be believed, there are around 100 dams in India that are more than 100 years old. In other words 100 ticking time bombs!

(Note: The quoted study provides for information only. It does not share the arguments fielded by the author)